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The impact of semi-presidentialism on governance in the 
Palestinian Authority (2003-2007) 
 
In recent years, semi-presidentialism – where a constitution creates a directly 
elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet collectively 
responsible to the legislature – has become the regime type of choice for nascent 
democracies. There are now nearly 60 countries with semi-presidential 
constitutions.1 And yet, the academic consensus is resolutely opposed to the 
adoption of semi-presidentialism. When Afghanistan was crafting its new 
constitution in 2003, a briefing report summed up the general attitude towards 
this type of constitutional arrangement: this system “risks creating two 
competing centers of power, which is probably not healthy for a polarized 
society emerging from conflict.”2 In short, while semi-presidentialism may be 
easy to choose, it is often considered to be difficult to operate.3 
 In 2002, President Arafat ratified the Basic Law of the Palestinian 
Authority. In March 2003 the Basic Law was amended, incorporating the position 
of a prime minister and making the prime minister and cabinet collectively 
responsible to the legislature. Thus, a semi-presidential system was adopted. In 
January 2005, following Arafat’s death, Mahmoud Abbas was elected president. 
He was supported by a Fatah majority in the legislature. However, in January 
2006, Hamas gained a majority at the legislative elections. This led to 
‘cohabitation’ between a Fatah president and a Hamas prime minister and 
government and created “two competing centers of power”, which is said to be 
so damaging for fragile democracies with semi-presidential constitutions. 
Following the election, and in the context of an extremely difficult domestic and 
international situation, the Palestinian Authority descended into civil war. By 
June 2007, the Palestinian Authority had, in effect, split in two, with Hamas 
ruling the Gaza Strip and Fatah retaining authority over the West Bank. In the 
same month President Abbas declared a state of emergency and dismissed the 
Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniya, though Hamas maintains that this 
decision was unconstitutional and still considers Haniya to be the legitimate 
head of government. Whatever the legality of the situation, by this time the 
governance structures of the Basic Law had all but broken down. 
 It is very difficult to determine to what extent semi-presidentialism is 
responsible for the problems of governance in the Palestinian Authority, but the 
importance of institutions in shaping the behaviour of political actors in the 
Palestinian context is often neglected in favour of other factors, which appear at 
first to be more relevant. Obviously, the internal and external problems faced by 
the Palestinian Authority are greater than those faced by almost any other 
jurisdiction in the world and it would be naive to suggest that semi-
presidentialism per se was anything other than a contributory factor to the 
problems faced by the Authority since January 2006. In some ways, the stage for 
a conflict between Fatah, reluctant to relinquish its role as the sole voice of the 
Palestinians, and Hamas, the new representative of Palestinian nationalism, was 
already set, but semi-presidential arrangements might have contributed to its 
timing and acceleration. As Kirschke has demonstrated in the case of sub-
Saharan African countries, institutionalized conflict between the president and 
the legislature can sometimes tip fragile regimes over the democratic edge.4 Was 
this the case in the Palestinian Authority? To what extent are the conventional 
arguments against semi-presidentialism supported by recent events in the 
Palestinian Authority? These are the questions this article aims to answer. 
These questions are important not merely as they relate to the Palestinian 
Authority or indeed as they relate to the study of semi-presidentialism generally. 
They are also important in the context of the growing literature analyzing the 
influence of institutions on political systems in the Arab world. For a long time, 
the study of the formal institutions in this region was neglected because it was 
believed that power was exercised largely through informal processes and 
channels. While this might have been true in the past, the democratizing and 
liberalising reforms of the 1980s and 1990s introduced a degree of political 
institutionalization that political actors had to contend with. Thus, while 
elections in most Arab countries still do not produce political change, it is 
important to analyse them because they reveal societal trends and offer insights 
into how political actors react to them.5 A similar argument can be made for 
analysing apparently powerless legislatures. An analysis of the effects of semi-
presidentialism on the choices of Palestinian political actors contributes to our 
understanding of the ways in which institutions matter in the Arab world.   
To begin, the standard arguments against semi-presidentialism are 
identified. Next, the constitutional structure of the amended Palestinian Basic 
Law is briefly outlined. Then, events during the period of cohabitation following 
the 2006 elections are analyzed to determine whether or not the problems of 
governance in the Palestinian Authority were associated with the textbook 
shortcomings of semi-presidentialism. 
For the purposes of this article semi-presidentialism is defined as the 
situation where a country’s constitution provides for both a directly elected 
fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively 
responsible to the legislature. This definition is slightly different from Duverger’s 
original presentation of the concept.6 However, it is now a common way of 
defining this constitutional form.7 On the basis of this definition, there are now 
nearly 60 countries with semi-presidential constitutions. This set of countries is 
very heterogeneous, including established West European examples such as 
Finland and France, as well as newer examples across the world, including 
Armenia, Haiti, Mongolia, Poland, Senegal and Taiwan. To make sense of the 
variety within the class of semi-presidential countries, there is a now standard 
distinction between two forms of semi-presidentialism. Based on the original 
work of Shugart and Carey, there are countries with a premier-presidential form 
of semi-presidentialism, which is where the prime minister is responsible solely 
to the legislature, while there are other countries with a president-parliamentary 
form, which is where the prime minister is responsible both to the legislature and 
to the president.8 Premier-presidential countries include France, Lithuania, Mali 
and Timor-Leste. President-parliamentary countries include the Central African 
Republic, Georgia, Russia and, in the past, Weimar Germany. As we shall see, 
the Palestinian Authority has a president-parliamentary form of semi-
presidentialism. 
 There are many reasons why semi-presidentialism may be a tempting 
constitutional choice. For example, when there is a weak executive, the 
introduction of a directly elected president can provide the promise of 
charismatic leadership. By contrast, if an already powerful president faces social 
unrest, then creating the post of prime minister and offering it to the opposition 
can be a way for the president to calm the situation while still remaining in 
power. That said, however politically expedient the adoption of semi-
presidentialism might often be, there is an overwhelming academic consensus 
against the introduction of this form of government.9 Moreover, within the set of 
semi-presidential countries, several observers have identified president-
parliamentarism as a more problematic form of semi-presidentialism than 
premier-presidentialism.10 The critics of semi-presidentialism point to the 
problems supposedly inherent in the institutional structure of semi-
presidentialism and suggest that these problems make governance more difficult 
generally and that in the case of nascent democracies they risk causing the 
collapse of the fledgling democratic system. If the academic wisdom is correct, 
therefore, then not only has the Palestinian Authority chosen a potentially 
damaging type of constitutional arrangement, it has also chosen the most 
dangerous sub-type of this form of government. 
There are various reasons why semi-presidentialism in general and 
president-parliamentarism in particular are considered to be problematic for new 
and fragile democracies. For example, Lijphart has warned against the excessive 
presidentialisation of power that can occur under semi-presidentialism. He 
argues that when the president is supported by a disciplined legislative majority 
semi-presidential systems “actually make it possible for the president to be even 
more powerful than in most pure presidential systems.”11 Usually, though, the 
critics of semi-presidentialism focus on the problems caused by the situation 
where the president does not enjoy the support of a disciplined legislative 
majority. Given this situation is the one that is potentially relevant to the case of 
the Palestinian Authority, we outline the two main variations of these problems 
both in relation to semi-presidentialism as a whole and to its president-
parliamentary form specifically. 
The first variation focuses on the potential for problems within the dual 
executive. In semi-presidential countries, the prime minister is responsible to the 
legislature. Therefore, to be appointed and to remain in office, the prime minister 
must have at least the tacit support of the legislature. When the president’s party 
fails to enjoy a legislative majority, then it may be the case that the president has 
to appoint a prime minister from a different party. In this event, the prime 
minister may be from a coalition that includes the president’s majority, or from a 
party or coalition that is opposed to the president. The first scenario - where the 
president and prime minister are from opposing parties but where the 
president’s party is represented in government – is called a ‘divided executive’. 
The second scenario – where the president and prime minister are from opposing 
parties and where the president’s party is not represented in government – is a 
particular example of a divided executive called ‘cohabitation’. 
The critics of semi-presidentialism have focused on the potential for intra-
executive conflict during periods when there is a divided executive and/or 
cohabitation. While semi-presidentialism seems to offer the potential for 
opposing actors to share at least some executive power, the critics of semi-
presidentialism suggest that such actors are unlikely to be satisfied with only 
limited executive authority and that the president and prime minister will try to 
compete for power. In the case of fragile democracies, such competition at the 
heart of the executive may be destabilizing. For example, Stepan and Suleiman, 
worry that the president may be tempted to use decree powers and subvert the 
rule of law, particularly if the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces and has the support of the military. So, they argue that the “main 
theoretical and political worry about semi-presidentialism, of course, is precisely 
the question of deadlock and constitutional conflict between the dual executive. 
A deadlock can become particularly dangerous if the president has special 
authority over the security forces and some emergency powers” (Stepan and 
Suleiman, 1995: 399).12 For his part, Fabbrini also worries that the competition 
between the president and prime minister may lead to gridlock. He states: 
“When the president is the leader of the party that controls the National 
Assembly, the executive gaze rests on him. When a different party controls the 
Assembly, the executive gaze focuses on the premier, with some conditions 
imposed by the president. Herein lies the main weakness of semipresidentialism: 
the possibility of a rift between the president with his popular majority and the 
premier with his legislative majority. Such a split could hamper of even paralyze 
the executive.”13 
The second variation of the problems associated with semi-
presidentialism focuses on the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature. Here, there is a potential problem of dual legitimacy. When the 
president does not enjoy the support of a disciplined legislative majority and the 
legislature refuses to support the president’s programme, the president may feel 
that his/her popular mandate is being undermined. By the same token, though, 
if the president refuses to cooperate with the legislature and/or tries to bypass it, 
the legislature may feel that its mandate is being undermined. In a consolidated 
democracy the resulting gridlock may lead to the inability to pass basic 
legislation such as the annual budget. This can lead to serious problems of 
governance. In a fragile democracy the problem of dual legitimacy may be more 
serious still. Here, it is likely to lead either to a breakdown in the rule of law as 
the president rules by decree or to a stalemate between the president and 
legislature that encourages the military to intervene to break the deadlock. In 
their work, Linz and Stepan are explicit about the dangers for young 
democracies of this sort of dual legitimacy: “When supporters of one or the other 
component of semi-presidentialism feel that the country would be better off if 
one branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would disappear 
or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and suffers an overall loss of 
legitimacy, since those questioning one or the other will tend to consider the 
political system undesirable as long as the side they favor does not prevail … [I]n 
a semipresidential system, policy conflicts often express themselves as a conflict 
between two branches of democracy.”14  
In addition to these general criticisms of semi-presidentialism, there are 
specific criticisms of the president-parliamentary form of semi-presidentialism. 
Under semi-presidentialism generally, the president must work through the 
prime minister and the legislature. As most French presidents would be able to 
confirm, when the president is the de facto leader of the legislative majority and 
the prime minister is subordinate to the president, then the president can be 
assured that his/her programme will be safely implemented. However, as we 
have seen, when the president fails to enjoy a supportive majority, there can be 
problems. In this event, there is a key difference between premier-
presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Under the former, the president 
cannot dismiss the prime minister. As a result, while all the problems of a 
divided executive may occur under premier-presidentialism, the president may 
decide simply to let the prime minister govern, knowing that s/he has no option 
but to put up with the person who has been approved by the legislature. Under 
president-parliamentarism, though, the president always retains the option of 
dismissing the prime minister as a way of trying to break the stalemate. Given 
the appointment of a replacement still requires the support of the legislature, the 
president may simply find that the relationship with the new prime minister is 
just as problematic, if not more so because of the crisis caused by the dismissal of 
his/her predecessor. In short, under president-parliamentarism the president’s 
ability to dismiss the prime minister can exacerbate the problems of a divided 
executive and dual legitimacy that are found generally under semi-
presidentialism. 
In rest of this article, we examine whether the problems of semi-
presidentialism in general and president-parliamentarism in particular 
contributed to the crisis of governance in the Palestinian Authority following the 
legislative elections in January 2006. This case is an appropriate one on which to 
test the predictions of the critics of semi-presidentialism. For example, the 
introduction of semi-presidentialism coincides with a decline in the quality of 
governance. The civil war in 2006-07 and the effective partition of the Palestinian 
Authority is probably evidence enough. However, there is other evidence too. 
Having risen from 5.5 (Not Free) in 2003 and 2004 to 5 (Partly Free) in 2005 and 
2006, the Freedom House ratings for the Palestinian Authority declined to 5.5 
(Not Free) in 2007, marking what might be construed as a collapse of 
democracy.15 Therefore, we have prime facie grounds to explore whether or not 
there is a link between the introduction of semi-presidentialism in the Palestinian 
Authority and the decline in the quality of governance. 
This case also provides a particularly difficult test for the critics of semi-
presidentialism. In the period under consideration the Palestinian Authority 
faced extremely challenging economic and social conditions and a chronic 
security crisis. These problems would probably have been enough to lead to a 
decline in the quality of governance almost anywhere. However, in the face of 
these problems, if we find evidence that semi-presidentialism had an 
independent negative effect on the governance situation in the Palestinian 
Authority, then the critics of semi-presidentialism can reasonably claim that their 
arguments hold water. To identify such an effect, we need to look for evidence 
that the actors themselves, and expert commentators, considered the 
constitutional arrangement to be a source of at least some of the problems with 
which the Authority was faced. Given the many other problems faced by these 
actors, if they single out the constitution as an additional source of problems, 
then we can conclude that semi-presidentialism had an effect. Before we look for 
such evidence, we briefly sketch the constitutional framework of the Basic Law. 
 
The Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority 
 
The Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority is the equivalent of an interim 
constitution that is meant to be in force until a fully sovereignty independent 
state is achieved and a permanent constitution is adopted. Work on the 
document began in 1993 and four years later the Legislative Council approved 
the agreed draft. However, President Arafat did not ratify the Basic Law until 
2002. Nonetheless, at that point the Palestinian Authority can be considered to 
have become a constitutional regime.16 
In 2002, the Basic Law established a presidential system. There was a 
directly elected president (Art. 51). There was also provision for a Council of 
Ministers, which was chaired by the president (Art. 62). However, there was no 
prime minister. The president had the power to remove ministers (Art. 62) and it 
was explicitly stated that ministers were responsible to the president (Art. 68). 
The Council of Ministers did require an investiture vote (Art. 64), and the 
president had the right to request a vote of confidence in the Council of Ministers 
by the Legislative Council (Art. 71). In addition, at the request of at least ten of its 
88 members, the Legislative Council could propose a vote of no-confidence in the 
Council of Ministers. The motion required a majority of the total number of 
members of the Legislative Council to be passed (Art. 44). Given that most 
presidential systems do not include provision for the collective responsibility of 
the cabinet, the 2002 Basic Law established a rather unusual form of 
presidentialism, but at this point it was not yet semi-presidential. 
In March 2003 the Basic Law was amended. In some respects, the 
amendments amount to a new constitution. The ordering of the Titles of the 
constitution was changed. The numbering of Articles was amended. However, in 
the context of this article, the key change was that the post of prime minister was 
created and both the prime minister and the Council of Ministers were given 
explicit powers that were not present in the 2002 document (Arts. 68 and 69). 
Following the 2003 amendment the president remains directly elected (Art. 34). 
The president has the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister (Art. 45). 
Indeed, it is stated explicitly that the prime minister is accountable to the 
president and to the Legislative Council (Art. 74). The prime minister chairs the 
Council of Ministers (Art. 68). As before, the government has to pass an 
investiture vote (Art. 66) and the Legislative Council can pass a motion of no-
confidence in the government (Art. 57 and Art. 78). In these ways, the 2003 
version of the Basic Law clearly established a semi-presidential regime. 
Moreover, given the prime minister was responsible to both the president and 
the legislature, it established a president-parliamentary form of semi-
presidentialism. 
In 2005 there was a further amendment to the Basic Law. This amendment 
was, in itself, very important, but it did not alter the semi-presidential nature of 
the constitution or its president-parliamentary form. The amendment specified 
that both the president and Legislative Council served for a four-year term of 
office. It also specified that the president was limited to two consecutive terms. It 
should be noted that the amendments did not specify that presidential and 
legislative elections were concurrent. In fact, they were not synchronised and, 
indeed, the absence of concurrent elections was the reason for the constitutional 
crisis that began in January 2006. In the next section, we examine whether semi-
presidentialism had an effect on the quality of governance in the Palestinian 
Authority from 2006-2007. We begin by arguing that conflict between Hamas and 
Fatah was not inevitable. We then suggests reasons why semi-presidential nature 
of the Palestinian institutions may have contributed to the increase in conflict 
between the rival forces. 
 
Semi-presidentialism and the collapse of Palestinian unity 
There is very little doubt that the “Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and President 
Abbas’s dismissal of the national unity government ... amount[ed] to a watershed 
in the Palestinian national movement’s history.”17 Since its inception, Palestinian 
nationalism had always been characterised by significant divisions with a 
number of different ideological strands competing for primacy. At times 
divisions have been so profound as to affect its very credibility and effectiveness. 
However, the charismatic leadership of Arafat and the necessity of steadfastness 
in the face of Israel allowed the nationalist movement to have a resemblance of 
unity and common intent in the creation of a Palestinian state. The Oslo peace 
process and the rise of Hamas as a nationalist-religious competitor opposed to 
the agreement that Fatah and the PLO had signed up to seemed to strain the 
unity of Palestinian nationalism to the limit, but for a period infighting and 
conflicts seemed to be under control and were quickly halted through calls for 
unity. It follows that the events of June 2007 were particularly shocking for 
ordinary Palestinians who saw political actors take up arms against each other. 
According to Milton-Edwards this “was nothing short of a civil war in Gaza 
between Fatah and Hamas.”18 
 To some, the events of 2007 were not as a surprise because Fatah and 
Hamas had been on a collision course for some time due to their scarcely 
reconcilable ideological and policy differences. Moreover, “once Hamas had 
beaten Fatah for control of the PA in the PLC elections that took place in January 
2006 the rivalry became increasingly difficult to contain.”19 The rise of Hamas 
had always represented a problematic development for Fatah, Israel and the 
international community because of the movement’s ideology, domestic policy 
preferences and stance on the peace process. Part of the literature regards 
Islamist movements as inherently anti-democratic and violent leading them 
therefore to use elections simply as an instrument to conquer power in order 
then to abolish democratic institutions and set up a regressive and authoritarian 
Islamic state.20 It follows that the rise of Hamas in Palestine was perceived as 
extremely divisive because it introduced religious ideological discourse at the 
heart of Palestinian nationalism, rendering it less accommodating to both its 
external and internal rivals. This understanding of political Islam in general and 
of Hamas in particular would point to the inevitability on the confrontation 
between Fatah and the Islamist movement, particularly in a context where the 
“root cause of the Palestinian condition (occupation and the absence of apolitical 
settlement with Israel)”21 is unresolved. Such an approach is however misleading 
for a number of reasons.  
First of all, the labelling of all political Islamist movements as inherently 
anti-democratic and violent is highly debatable from a theoretical point of view, 
as it is impossible to determine a priori and in isolation from the surrounding 
institutional context how a political movement will behave in a pluralistic and 
competitive environment.22 Empirical evidence also supports the view that 
Islamist movements should be analysed and understood in the specific contexts 
within which they operate.23 In the case of Hamas, it should be for instance 
highlighted that the movement has always had a high regard for procedural 
democracy. As both Gunning pointed out, throughout its existence Hamas 
always displayed a significant degree of internal democracy.24 In addition, 
Hamas candidates regularly participated in the elections of the representative 
bodies of the professional organisations, the students’ unions and the local 
councils, although they boycotted the 1996 PLC elections because they were a 
direct emanation of Oslo. 
Secondly, the link between violence and Islamism should also be 
challenged. It is often assumed that Islamists directly or indirectly support the 
use of violence to attain political objectives and this is certainly true for avowedly 
jihadi movements operating both within Palestinian society25 and in the wider 
Muslim world.26 However, Hamas does not fall into this category and its use of 
violence is much more pragmatic and part of a much broader strategy which 
includes delivery of social services and electoral politics to achieve the creation of 
Palestinian state.27 Before 2007, the use of violence on the part of Hamas was 
almost solely directed towards Israel and was justified with a discourse of 
resistance. On the domestic scene Hamas had largely refrained from employing 
violence and when its militants were involved in sporadic clashes with Fatah, it 
was usually as a response to Arafat’s perceived repressive measures against the 
movement on the instigation of Israel and the United States.28 In addition, Hamas 
leaders always emphasised that once in power they would respect political and 
social pluralism. 
Finally, it should be highlighted that the position of Hamas regarding the 
peace process with Israel, the most significant bone of contention with Fatah, is 
neither as unique nor simple as often portrayed. It is not unique because other 
Palestinian groups, both religious and secular, rejected the Oslo accords by virtue 
of the fact that they perceived them to be a ‘sell-out.’ The attitude of Hamas to 
the peace process is also not simply rejectionist and ideological as some claim.29 
While formally opposed to Oslo, it nevertheless supports peace with the Israelis, 
although it has a very different conceptualisation of what a just peace involves 
and what should be done to achieve it. It is obviously an idea of peace that 
clashes with the one that Israel and the international community have in mind. 
For instance Hamas has offered a long truce (the hudna) if Israel leaves the 
occupied territories and the withdrawal of Israel should be the pre-condition for 
future negotiations according to the Hamas leadership.30 This obviously is in 
stark contrast to what Israel wants and to what the international community 
offers. In practice, Hamas, by working within the institutions that the Oslo 
accords set up, demonstrated that it has indirectly recognised Israel and the logic 
of peace, but this informal recognition will not translate into the abandonment of 
armed resistance unless Israel, as the occupying power, withdraws without 
conditions. This attitude has profound consequences for the relationship with 
Fatah and the PLO because it points towards a certain convergence of objectives, 
namely the creation of Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. With this in 
mind, it should therefore come as no surprise that the armed wings of both 
Hamas and Fatah co-operated quite regularly during the second uprising. More 
significantly, Hamas has been very careful throughout its existence to avoid 
permanent splits of the Palestinian camp despite its opposition to Oslo and the 
accusations of corruption and poor governance against Fatah and the PLO. The 
relevance for the movement of the concept of fitna (civil strife and dissent), which 
has to be avoided for practical reasons and in order to obey a religious 
imperative, should not be underestimated in the context of Hamas’s discourse 
and activism. This concept has guided the way in which the movement operated 
until the summer of 2007 when a breaking point with Fatah and the PLO was 
reached.          
 From this brief analysis, it becomes difficult to argue that there was a 
significant degree of inevitability about the confrontation between Hamas and 
Fatah and that the blame should be placed squarely on the Islamic resistance 
movement. As Robinson highlighted “conflict between these two elements…is 
not inevitable. Fatah and Hamas cadres went to school together, spent time in 
Israeli prisons together, and cooperated tactically for many years.”31  
Furthermore, if tensions had always existed and internal Palestinian discord on 
how both to deal with Israel and to construct a Palestinian state was always 
present, what explains then the timing of the breakdown of Palestinian 
nationalism and the collapse of the Authority? Part of the answer lies in the 
institutional organisation of the Palestinian Authority. This is the subject to 
which we now turn. 
 
 
The perils of semi-presidentialism 
While the Palestinian Authority operated under an extremely challenging 
set of economic, social and security conditions in 2006-2007, the semi-presidential 
structures of the 2003 amended Basic Law highlighted and accelerated divisions 
between Hamas and Fatah during this period, creating a new arena of 
confrontation with popular electoral legitimacy at heart of it. They did so by 
placing the two actors within an institutional context that made it more difficult 
for them to come to a non-formal arrangement through which differences could 
be resolved. Simultaneously, the quality and coherence of governance, in an 
already difficult situation, worsened significantly because deep divisions 
between Palestinian political actors were exposed, leading Hamas and Fatah to 
adopt conflicting policies that in the longer run undermined the very unity of the 
Palestinian Authority.   
From the beginning the Hamas government had to contend with the 
opposition of President Abbas, who appropriated significant powers even before 
the new government took office and subsequently threatened on a regular basis 
to dismiss the Haniya government. Through a number of presidential decrees, 
Abbas “claimed exclusive presidential authority over the police force, the various 
media outlets ... the Property Sale and Registration Department and control over 
the crossing points between Israel and the Palestinian territories.”32 In addition, 
threats of dismissal were periodically made and they intensified in December 
2006 when the pressure of the international community on Abbas to deal with 
Hamas became quite strong. The negative influence of the semi-presidential 
arrangements, in particular the president’s ability to dismiss the prime minister, 
destabilised the cabinet and the PA as a whole because it led Hamas cabinet 
members to have to continuously reassert their legitimacy and stand up to 
Abbas. This had two consequences. On the one hand, it heightened the stakes of 
the game, which became one where proving the legitimacy of both institutions 
became the objective of politics rather than the justification for implementing 
policies. On the other hand, it made it inevitable that the day-to-day running of 
the PA was neglected by both actors as they were locked into a political battle for 
institutional supremacy. The victory of Hamas had shocked the international 
community and Fatah and this victory was unacceptable because it was 
perceived to undermine decades of international efforts to secure a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict. Thus, the decision was made that the international 
community would boycott the Hamas-led government by severing diplomatic 
ties and halting financial aid, while Fatah would refuse to enter in a national 
unity government as Hamas had offered in January 2006. This strategy was 
supposed to render governance ineffective and show up Hamas to the 
Palestinian electorate as an ineffective political force that would only weaken the 
Palestinian struggle. As part of this strategy, it was suggested that Abbas could 
use his constitutional powers to dismiss the government and call for new 
elections, which would yield a different result and reinstall Fatah in power 
because the Palestinians would perceive Hamas as a failure. As a Guardian report 
of December 2006 indicated, President Abbas “count[ed] on the fact that 10 
months of chaos and increasing poverty will have left Palestinians sufficiently 
disillusioned with Hamas to return Fatah to power.”33 The threat of calling for 
new elections was never carried out because it emerged that Hamas might in fact 
be returned to be power despite its inability to implement its manifesto and 
because the movement itself strongly signalled that calling new elections, 
although a constitutional prerogative of the President, would amount to “a coup 
against Palestinian legitimacy and the will of the Palestinian people”. The 
hardliner Hamas leader Siyam stated: “Abbas has the right to dismiss the 
government but he has no right to give legitimacy to any future government” 
and added that “there are enough constitutional, legal and popular measures to 
enable us to confront anything that we regard as harmful to Palestinian national 
interests, led by our right in the Legislative Council to bring down any 
government and rob it of any legitimacy”. 34  
The discussion about the threat of dismissal and the calling of new 
elections represents a significant example of the impasse that semi-
presidentialism provoked and illustrates how such an arrangement increased the 
likelihood of a showdown between the presidency and the cabinet because it 
provided the opportunity for both actors to use constitutional prerogatives and 
popular legitimacy to validate their respective positions and demands. Hamas, 
often accused of being the spoiler of Palestinian politics, found itself in the 
position of defending the constitutional status of its members of parliament and 
its cabinet, leading the movement to utilise exclusively political means and legal 
discourse to carry out its objectives. If the position of the cabinet had been wholly 
subordinated to presidential powers, the Hamas leadership and Hamas 
parliamentarians would have been more reluctant to challenge the policy 
decisions of the President for fear of provoking a split within the nationalist 
camp. In the event, though, Hamas did not see new elections as a way of 
recomposing the nationalist camp and giving way to a national unity 
government, but as an attempt by a discredited and defeated Fatah to take both 
legitimacy and policy-making power away from the cabinet. Accordingly, the 
movement not only questioned the political legitimacy of new elections, but 
refused in December 2006 to consider a national unity government in which they 
would have to give up key ministries to Fatah.35 Playing the institutional game 
taught Hamas that the movement could take the moral high ground and increase 
its legitimacy among ordinary Palestinians and it is partly for this reason that it 
was able to very quickly dismantle Fatah power in Gaza and consolidate its rule 
after June 2007 without losing support in the West Bank.36 The national unity 
government agreed in March 2007 between Fatah and Hamas to resolve the 
previous year’s impasse never got off the ground because by then the two 
competing centres of power had realised that the PA institutions would not be 
able to accommodate the irreconcilable legitimacy claims and policies of the two 
actors. When Abbas decided to finally dismiss Haniya, Hamas leaders refused to 
accept the legitimacy of the decision, making the following descent into chaos 
and civil war inevitable. The dispute over who has the constitutional right to 
govern in the PA is not over, but as the Al Ahram weekly commentator aptly put 
it “any talk about legitimacy is no longer relevant, for all constitutional and legal 
norms have been discarded.”37 
When Abbas issued presidential decrees to appropriate a number of 
functions and powers that should have been left to the cabinet, he signalled very 
strongly his intention to marginalise Hamas. However, the popular mandate 
Hamas received in the 2006 elections encouraged the movement to hold firm 
against Abbas, leading ministers to dispute the president’s decisions and powers. 
The quality and coherence of governance inevitably suffered from this deadlock 
and this is evident for instance in the crucial area of policing and security. 
Following the formation of the Hamas’s government in March 2006, the Minister 
of Interior Said Siyam set out to claim its constitutional right of transforming the 
security sector and bringing it entirely under the control of the cabinet. The 
reform of the security sector was a highly controversial and significant issue 
within the Palestinian Authority because of its importance for the peace process. 
According to Hilal and Khan “the initial focus of externally assisted institutional 
capacity-building in the PNA was in the area of policing, surveillance and the 
maintenance of internal order. The PNA had to prove its capacity in these areas 
in order to make progress towards statehood.”38 This led to a proliferation of 
security services and police forces, which were highly disconnected from one 
another but which were all connected to the Presidency. Loyalty to Arafat and 
Fatah was expected and when, therefore, the Hamas cabinet announced that it 
would exercise its constitutional right to assert its authority in this area through 
the Ministry of Interior, President Abbas used his role of commander-in-chief 
and head of the National Security Council to strengthen his grip on the security 
forces, place them under his direct control and build up his own Presidential 
Guard. The Hamas cabinet responded to this constitutional challenge by 
announcing that it would therefore create a parallel security force, which was 
made up of members of the al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of the 
movement. The establishment of a new force loyal to Hamas was originally 
opposed by Abbas, although he eventually accepted their incorporation into the 
Palestinian police forces to avoid a confrontation so soon after the swearing in of 
the Hamas cabinet. However, the question of control was never resolved and, 
therefore, Fatah and Hamas loyalists in the security forces refrained from 
cooperating. This rift institutionalised two separate and rival security forces 
whose civilian masters both claimed to be the true representatives of popularly 
sanctioned law and order. This meant that the quality of policing, already 
plagued by problems of corruption, nepotism and arbitrary behaviour, 
significantly decreased and the institutionalisation of two security forces 
paradoxically provoked more insecurity for ordinary Palestinians caught 
between two competing security agencies. 
While violence might have in any case erupted between Hamas and Fatah 
because their political objectives were so divergent, the inability to cooperate on 
the issue of policing and security deepened the rift between them. Both political 
actors could in fact claim that they had the constitutional and popular mandate 
to impose their respective wills. Viken convincingly argues that “Hamas’s forces 
represented a tradition of armed resistance, whereas the Fatah security structures 
were established by the Oslo accords with the objective of fighting violence and 
terrorism”39 domestically. While the seeds of the conflict had therefore been 
already sown, the institutional arrangements deepened the rift because they 
forced the two actors to a showdown on the use and direction of the security 
forces given that the presidency saw them as a rampart against what he 
perceived to be ‘domestic extremism,’ while the Hamas cabinet saw them as a 
resource to be mobilised against Israel. If a clearer separation of powers had been 
adopted, it could have been more complicated for any of the two actors to 
establish a security force claiming to be sole representative of the will of the 
Palestinians. Instead, the creation of two centres of power led to the 
institutionalisation of polarisation, laying the foundations for the civil conflict. 
In an October 2006 interview Siyam’s frustration with the institutional 
arrangements strongly emerged as he believed they impinged on his job as 
minister of interior in place. When asked to comment on rumours regarding the 
establishment of a Palestinian quasi-army in the West Bank loyal to Fatah and 
ready to take on Hamas, he replied that “there are things that are going on 
behind the scenes and without the knowledge of the interior minister, such as 
bringing arms inside the Gaza Strip. We as a government and an interior 
minister know nothing about this.”40 Said Siyam also emphasised more generally 
that the discord with President Abbas undermined governance because “when 
we were in the 10th government [the Hamas government that preceded the unity 
government], the president did not participate with us in any meeting or visit on 
any level for a whole year. He worked separately from us.”41 While not referring 
specifically to the issue of security, it emerges quite clearly that the Hamas 
cabinet felt that institutions within which they were working did not in practice 
reflect the victory they had won at the polls and the popular mandate they were 
supposed to be carrying out. With regard to the issue of the control of the 
security forces, it is interesting to mention that a similar rift occurred when the 
Minister of Interior was Abbas himself (he was also the Prime Minister) and the 
president was Arafat, both from Fatah. They clashed often on this issue because 
they fundamentally disagreed on the type of reforms and future role of the 
Palestinian security force. Arafat finally won out when Abbas was forced to 
resign in favour of a Fatah member more loyal to Arafat. This conflict over the 
control of the security forces did not degenerate into an open conflict as it would 
with the Hamas cabinet because both Arafat and Abbas belonged to Fatah, 
indicating that when the president and the prime minister are from the same 
party semi-presidentialism is not an obstacle to policy coherence and 
governance, as one of them advances while the other retreats.   
 The negative consequences of semi-presidentialism are very evident also 
when one looks at the ‘foreign policy’ of the Palestinian Authority. When Fatah 
controlled both the presidency and the cabinet, first Arafat and then Abbas were 
clearly the only voice of the Palestinians on the international system and, 
crucially, they were directing the negotiations with Israel through the PLO 
structures. With the creation of a strong cabinet, the position of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs became more important, but it is only with the appointment of 
Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar that it became clear that the institutional 
arrangements would have an extremely negative effect on how Palestinian 
foreign affairs were conducted, leading once again to conflicts and precipitating 
the collapse of Palestinian unity on the international stage. Upon his 
appointment as foreign minister, Zahar had this to say about the peace process 
and negotiations with Israel: “Israel wants to negotiate only for the sake of 
negotiations, but on the ground, it expands settlements and continues building 
the separation fence on Palestinian territories. Israel doesn't want peace, nor does 
it have any peace project. Therefore, we should not deceive our people and tell 
them that there will be negotiations”.42 This stance, while coherent with Hamas’s 
campaign promises, completely contradicted the President’s attitude towards the 
peace process and the negotiations with Israel. While Abbas was also critical of 
what he perceived to be of Israel’s inflexible attitude, he remained ready to talk 
to Israel and to the international community. This was not Hamas’s position, 
which demanded complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, including 
East Jerusalem, as a pre-condition for talks with Israel. The positions of Fatah 
and Hamas were well known before Hamas won the elections, but it is the 
powers the cabinet had in shaping foreign policy that gave Hamas the 
confidence to contradict Abbas. For Hamas, it was their Minister of Foreign 
Affairs that spoke for the Palestinians and therefore it was less restrained in 
undermining Abbas than it might have been without a significant electoral 
victory and the ensuing constitutional powers it enjoyed. The end of a united 
Palestinian voice in international affairs weakened significantly the Authority 
because it was now apparent that even if a deal had been struck with Abbas, the 
Palestinian president would be in no position to implement it. A stalemate in the 
negotiations obviously followed together with the marginalisation of Hamas in 
the international sphere. 
In these ways, the evidence indicates that the semi-presidential system 
that the Palestinian Authority adopted made the split between Hamas and Fatah 
inevitable, rendering effective governance of the Authority impossible and 
virtually ending the Palestinian democratic experiment. The two sides have been 
playing the blame game since the break-up, but according to Tamimi “Abbas 
contrived to establish a parallel government whose policies were diametrically 
opposed to those of the elected government and whose powers had the effect of 
rendering the legitimate government powerless.”43 Without the legitimacy of 
new elections having taken place, it is difficult to argue that the President did not 
overstep its boundaries. As for Hamas, when the attempts to build a national 
unity government collapsed in March 2007, leading to the break-up of the 
Authority into two separate entities, Zahar commented that “we are the 
Palestinian Authority. Hamas should govern Gaza and the West Bank. What 
happened was a real coup against the election results,”44 Fatah’s cohabitation 
with Hamas quickly descended into civil war and recriminations on both sides. 
Thus, the opening up of a new arena of confrontation between Fatah and Hamas 
catalyzed their differences, making the reconstruction of Palestinian unity a more 
difficult task than it would otherwise have been. 
 
Conclusion 
  In January 2006 the Palestinian Authority began a period of cohabitation 
between a Fatah president and a Hamas prime minister and cabinet. During the 
next 12 months, the Authority, already weakened by internal economic and 
social problems and the external security situation, gradually slid into near total 
ineffectiveness, institutional incoherence and civil war. The semi-presidential 
structure of the 2003 amended Basic Law was the source of this destabilising 
period of competition within the executive. We wish to stress that cohabitation 
did not determine the outbreak of conflict between Hamas and Fatah. Such 
conflict was the outcome of divergent interpretations of the conflict with Israel 
and the product of different ideological convictions. Nonetheless, the problems 
of cohabitation contributed significantly to the timing and scale of the 
confrontation between the two actors. The creation of two competing centres of 
power with equal popular legitimacy raised the political stakes within the system 
as both actors tried to undermine the position of other. In particular, the 
president’s repeated threats to dismiss the prime minister and call fresh elections 
while refusing to cooperate with the cabinet was extremely destabilising. In the 
meantime, crucial issues of governance were neglected and there was deadlock 
in a number of areas such as foreign policy, peace with Israel and domestic 
security. In this context, the constitutional crisis was ‘resolved’ by armed conflict, 
which created two separate jurisdictions that are one in name only. These events 
demonstrate that political institutions can, and do, have an impact of political 
outcomes in the Arab world because political actors take them seriously and are 
responsive to the structures of incentives and constraints created. Specifically, 
they underline the perils of semi-presidentialism and, in particular, the perils of 
the president-parliamentary form of semi-presidentialism. To maximise their 
chances of survival developing democracies should steer clear of this form of 
semi-presidentialism, and perhaps semi-presidentialism altogether, if they wish 
to maximise their chances of surviving. 
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